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EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF COMMON LAW 
EFFICIENCY: REASONS FOR (COGNITIVE) 
SKEPTICISM 
ADAM J. HIRSCH* 
 Professor Jeffrey Stake’s article on legal evolution raises impor-
tant, even tantalizing, questions from the perspective of behavioral 
theories of law.1 Those theories have emphasized the intellectual 
frailties of human persons—frailties that cloud judgment and lead 
decisionmakers astray, sometimes in systematic ways. The extent to 
which persons nonetheless allocate optimally their scarce cognitive 
resources is a subject of ongoing debate today within the field of cog-
nitive psychology.2 Be that as it may, the finding that decisions re-
flect the bounded rationality, rather than global rationality, of the 
persons who make them distinguishes cognitive psychology from eco-
nomics and, by extension, behavioral analysis of law from conven-
tional law and economics.  
 From a behavioral perspective, recognition of the potential for ir-
rationality by citizens can serve to justify paternalistic rules that op-
erate to limit choice, and thereby to protect citizens from the regret 
that would accompany poor decisions.3 Yet the cognitive deficiencies 
of judges themselves—being every bit as human as the persons 
whose suits they hear—suggest that they, too, are apt to make im-
perfect choices. As concerns their lawmaking function, judges’ efforts 
to craft ideal common law rules are doomed to failure4—a failure that 
                                                                                                                    
 * William and Catherine VanDercreek Professor of Law, Florida State University. 
M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987 Yale University. Thanks to Gregory Crespi, Shubha 
Ghosh, Chris Guthrie, Paul Rubin, and Jenia Iontcheva Turner for helpful comments. 
 1. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential 
Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2005). 
 2. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS 
& PROC., May 2004, at 408; Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, Bounded Rationality to the 
World, 24 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 143 (2003). 
 3. The literature on this subject is now vast, as the notes accompanying articles 
within this Symposium attest. On the paternalistic implications of behavioral analysis of 
law, see Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive 
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 17-22 (1995); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541-45 
(1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1165 (2003); and Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 
254-75 (1998). Compare Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003), with Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Pa-
ternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
 4. I explore the implications of bounded rationality for the lawmaking process in 
Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hirsch, Jurisprudence]; and Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1057, 1144-62 (1996) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inconsistency]. See also Stephen M. Bain-
bridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else 
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(by analogy) paternalistic mechanisms can forestall only in limited 
respects.5  
 Accordingly, scholars who posit that judges generally aspire to es-
tablish efficient rules6 cannot thereby conclude that the common law 
tends ineluctably in that direction. Those scholars must take into ac-
count the pressures of time and shortcomings of ability that degrade 
judicial decisionmaking. Anything concocted by the human mind—
including law—betrays the infirmities of that mind. At any rate, 
common experience with common law suggests that judges have var-
ied, and often eclectic, tastes7—including, increasingly, a taste for 
policies inspired by the subject matter of this Symposium.8  
 Thoughtful design is not, however, the only means whereby hu-
man artifacts can come into being. Many artifacts actually derive 
from chance discovery or protracted processes of trial and error. Ne-
cessity is the mother of experimentation, as well as invention, and 
through such means artifacts can be said to evolve—as forms of life 
evolve—through undirected processes of natural selection. Over long 
spaces of time, this remarkable engine imbues nature’s handiwork 
with a degree of inadvertent perfection, of apparent design, that no 
mortal designer could begin to replicate (which is not to say that 
even nature is perfectly perfect9). Some artifacts display the very 
same characteristic.10 
 All of this has intriguing implications for theories of legal change. 
Economists maintain that the market comprises a blind mechanism 
that drives traders toward efficient production of wealth. The state of 
their minds becomes irrelevant because traders take their cues from 
                                                                                                                    
Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002); 
Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002). 
 5. Under a system of separation of powers, some of those paternalistic mechanisms 
must be, more precisely, self-paternalistic. The self-imposed doctrine that dicta are not 
binding provides an example. See Hirsch, Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 1366-67. 
 6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.2, at 532-33 (6th ed. 
2003).  
 7. Even Judge Posner concedes that “there is more to justice than economics.” 
Id. § 2.3, at 28. 
 8. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and 
Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
213, 218 & n.21 (2000); Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1065, 1145 n.162. 
 9. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, The Panda’s Thumb, in THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE 
REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 19, 24 (1980). 
 10. See HENRY PETROSKI, THE EVOLUTION OF USEFUL THINGS 211 (1992) (“[A]s has 
been the case throughout history, craft and engineering advances could and often did pro-
ceed even in the absence of scientific explanations.”). For an early recognition of the power 
of protracted trial-and-error, allowing, for example, a “complicated[,] useful and beautiful” 
ship to be built by a “stupid mechanic,” see DAVID HUME, DIALOGUES CONCERNING 
NATURAL RELIGION 130 (Stanley Tweyman ed., Rutledge New ed. 1991) (1779). 
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the invisible hand.11 If common law likewise takes shape as a conse-
quence of blind evolutionary processes, through “the system[’s] biases 
of its own,” as Professor Stake puts it,12 then it possesses the poten-
tial to reach a degree of adaptability, a developmental sophistication, 
that only a mindless process can achieve. From a cognitive perspec-
tive, law would burst the bounds of human rationality. 
 Ultimately, however, I remain unpersuaded by the analogy and 
skeptical of the model. If the common law features some elements of 
an evolutionary system, it is also, through and through, a participa-
tory system. Human participation cannot but leave its indelible 
stamp.13  
*     *     * 
 To be sure, one can identify a fundamental similarity between the 
dynamics of a common law system and a natural system. Each in-
cludes an apparatus for self-replication. In nature, that apparatus is 
the DNA molecule; in law, it is the jurisprudential principle of stare 
decisis. But the direct parallel between the dynamics of the two sys-
tems pretty much ends there. In nature, a large population of organ-
isms contains stable polymorphisms and, at each generation, a small 
number of spontaneous genetic mutations. Those organisms compete 
with one another for survival, producing adaptations in response to 
environmental change. 
 Within a hierarchical legal system, the opportunity for legal 
polymorphisms and mutations is quite limited. Once a rule is 
adopted by the high court, the replicative apparatus of precedent is 
especially strong and conservative in suppressing variations within 
the manifold lower courts. Only in cases of first impression can al-
ternative rules coexist in lower courts—and even then, those alterna-
tives do not proceed to compete with each other in a blind way; in due 
course, the high court will select one alternative or another on the 
basis of reasoned choice. Once the high court has ruled on an issue, 
the common law for the jurisdiction is set. There is a relevant “ge-
netic” population of one and no store of diversity to meet new threats.  
                                                                                                                    
 11. An individual trader in a market “neither intends to promote the public interest, 
nor knows how much he is promoting it.” 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE 
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannon ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 
1976) (1776).   
 12. Stake, supra note 1, at 406. For a recent survey of evolutionary theories of law, 
see Paul H. Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient?, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS (Francesco Parisi & Charles Rowley eds. 
forthcoming 2005), reprinted with revisions in Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Effi-
ciency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2005).  
 13. In this respect, my thesis parallels analyses by cognitive theorists who conclude 
that the blind pressures of an economic market generally will not suffice to extinguish irra-
tional behavior by traders. See, e.g., Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of 
Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1071, 1074 passim (1985). 
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 The evolutionary mechanisms conjectured by legal scholars differ 
structurally from the mechanism of natural selection. The one most 
closely akin to the model of natural selection, sometimes termed “dif-
ferential investment,”14 posits that parties with more to gain from a 
favorable rule will tend to invest more in the litigation contest than 
their adversaries with less at stake, leading inexorably in the direc-
tion of the rule that creates the greatest wealth (and hence effi-
ciency). Over time, the more efficient rule becomes the “fitter” rule 
and survives because it is backed by greater adversarial resources. 
Even in a population of one, where no alternative rule is extant, the 
relentless pressure of periodic, lopsided litigation exerts itself upon 
an inefficient rule until eventually it gives way. 
 Even taking for granted the hypothesis that judicial lawmaking 
operates in the manner postulated, responding to the functional 
equivalent of market signals,15 one can identify a number of soft 
spots in this theory. Those soft spots appear even when we assume 
global rationality and probe the model with the traditional tools of 
law and economics.16 Of course, the amount any particular litigant 
stands to gain from a rule change bears no necessary relation to the 
amount that all potential litigants would gain—a random element 
that theorists get around by assuming (not unreasonably?) that, on 
average, the ratios of individual gains and losses will correspond 
with the ratios of aggregate gains and losses.17 There is also the prob-
lem that rules are sticky. Whereas the prospect of greater wealth 
creates incentives to pour money into litigation, the doctrine of 
precedent stacks the adversarial deck against a party who seeks to 
revise a rule, whether or not the existing rule is efficient. Hence, ad-
vocacy of a rule change should prove more costly than defense of 
precedent. Theorists have acknowledged this point by limiting the 
differential-investment model to instances where rules are suffi-
ciently inefficient initially to overcome the structural bias in favor of 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the 
Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 156 (1980). 
 15. Of course, any number of institutional protections function nowadays to insulate 
judges from direct economic incentives, but that does not mean they are impervious to in-
tellectual influence. Proponents of this model are not so bold as to assert that judicial law-
making goes to the highest bidder, only that “any increment in legal expenses c will induce 
an increment, however small, in the probability π of winning a favorable decision.” John C. 
Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 
394 (1978). 
 16. I am hardly the first observer to raise critical objections to these theories. See, e.g., 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 584-85 passim 
(1992) (arguing that common law rules are reconsidered within cases that form a biased 
subset of the varied, potential disputes to which the rule applies, and for which the rule 
may or may not achieve efficiency—a criticism the author applies to both advertent and 
inadvertent models of lawmaking dynamics).  
 17. See Goodman, supra note 15, at 404-06; see also Stake, supra note 1, at 407-08. 
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stasis.18 Yet, the difficulty remains that common law change can oc-
cur, and historically has tended to occur, incrementally.19 If we factor 
incrementalism into the instant model, then we would expect com-
mon law rules to move toward efficiency, and then to cease moving at 
some point short of efficiency, once the marginal cost of dislodging 
the next increment of precedent begins to exceed the marginal gain 
anticipated by the rule change.  
 The stickiness of rules presents a second obstacle to legal effi-
ciency. When persons contemplate investing in litigation, they must 
also decide how to allocate their capital between analysis of law and 
development of facts. Given the stickiness of legal doctrine, rational 
parties should often find fact development more cost-effective. Hence, 
litigation “portfolios” might lean systematically toward producing ef-
ficient outcomes, without generating efficient rules.  
 Still another difficulty stems from the circumstance that, to the 
extent parties can bid for them, common law rules comprise public 
goods: those who pay for rules cannot prevent others from sharing in 
their use. Individual parties therefore have a rational incentive to 
underinvest in rules, hoping they can instead free ride on the ex-
penses borne by other, similarly situated parties.20 Once again, theo-
rists acknowledge this problem,21 although they need also to consider 
how it is magnified in the special context of litigation: Parties divide 
their investment between the public good of law and the development 
of facts, which remains a private good that others cannot share. This 
second investment outlet should enhance rational incentives to cur-
tail production of public goods.  
 And all of this comes before we get to problems of irrationality! 
The instant model of common law evolution assumes judicial conduct 
in rulemaking to be mechanistic, following the money, so to say, but 
the model nevertheless presupposes conscious deliberation at an ear-
lier stage by parties to the litigation. Hence, the differential-
investment model remains adulterated by an element of cognition: 
From a behavioral perspective, the model moves us out of the frying 
pan and into the fire.  
 Consider status quo bias, the demonstrated tendency of persons to 
value what they already own more than the prospect of gaining 
                                                                                                                    
 18. See Goodman, supra note 15, at 394-95, 405. 
 19. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 70-74, 105-18 
(1988). For an earlier recognition by an astute observer, see S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 
205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 20. On the economics of public goods, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968). 
 21. See Goodman, supra note 15, at 405-06. Collective action could solve the problem, 
but different interest groups have varying abilities to operate collectively. Id.  
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something else of equal value.22 Persons grow accustomed to the 
things—and to the rights—they possess and tend relatively to over-
value those things and rights, even if they would prefer other ones 
were they starting from scratch.  
 In other words, familiarity breeds content. Status quo bias should 
cause parties to place a premium on the legal status quo, be it effi-
cient or inefficient.23 However fundamental to economics, the as-
sumption that persons assess the wealth created by rights objectively 
finds no support in cognitive psychology.  
 Along with assessments of gain and loss, litigation entails as-
sessments of risk. And, here again, we must contend with cognitive 
illusions. Consider the availability heuristic, the tendency of persons 
to estimate the probability of an event by virtue of how readily in-
stances of that event spring to mind.24 Such a thought experiment 
leads persons to exaggerate the relative frequency of unusual, and 
thereby vivid, events, while underestimating that of the mundane. In 
connection with litigation, instances in which courts overrule com-
mon law decisions ought to be more salient than those upholding 
precedents, leading parties to envision rules as more unstable, more 
protean, than they actually are. This illusion might lead parties who 
would benefit from a rule change to underestimate the investment 
necessary to attain that goal; vice versa, those parties who benefit 
from an existing rule may be led by the same illusion to overinvest in 
defending the status quo. 
 If status quo bias and the availability heuristic add (in different 
ways) to the friction impeding legal dynamics, any number of other 
cognitive—and, for that matter, cultural, emotional, or sociobiologi-
cal—forces could affect litigation expenditures randomly, thereby 
contributing to the aimlessness of the common law. Consider one 
more example: the sunk-cost effect.25 People’s sense of endowment in 
investments they have made, moneys already sunk into a scheme, 
                                                                                                                    
 22. For a survey of the copious literature on this subject, see JONATHAN BARON, 
THINKING AND DECIDING 288-91 (3d ed. 2000). But cf. Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, 
The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” and Experi-
mental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (ques-
tioning the existing body of evidence). 
 23. Within economic theory, path dependence comprises a rational echo of status quo 
bias: The expense private parties would have to bear to convert to a new legal rule can 
outweigh its efficiency. For judicial recognitions of path dependence as a policy justification 
for legal stasis, see Hirsch, Inconsistency, supra note 4, at 1157-58 & n.295 (1996); and 
Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of Doctrinal 
Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 532 n.19 (2000). See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path De-
pendence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 
86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-62 (1996).  
 24. The literature is surveyed in BARON, supra note 22, at 141-43. 
 25. Id. at 297-300. 
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induces them to invest more if necessary to prevent the sums already 
expended from being “wasted.” Hence, once in for a penny, persons 
are disposed to stay in for a pound.26 In connection with litigation, 
the sunk-cost effect could trigger irrational bidding wars for favor-
able outcomes, as adversaries seek to protect sums they have already 
invested to win the case. 
 Professor Stake identifies the fee tail as an inefficient common 
law construct that may have owed its demise to evolutionary forces.27 
Yet, as Stake acknowledges, the fee tail was also very popular!28 
What could explain its popularity? Culture may have played a sig-
nificant role, lending an aura of sacredness to ancestral property; or, 
as Stake speculates, sociobiological impulses could have been in-
volved.29 But there may also have been psychological forces at work: 
Persons appear to derive satisfaction from the very act of exercising 
control over things,30 and a fee tail maximizes one’s temporal control 
over property.31 Psychologists have also observed in persons a desire 
to sustain their identities beyond the grave,32 and a fee tail likewise 
served this end, helping to preserve the memory and status of gran-
tors, and thereby enabling them to achieve a kind of immortality.33 
                                                                                                                    
 26. Professor Stake offers a contrary aphorism to suggest that “informal culture . . . 
teaches us to ignore sunk costs,” Stake, supra note 1, at 404-05, yet experimental evidence 
of the phenomenon is ample. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of 
Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985) (reporting 
the results of ten experiments).   
 27. Stake, supra note 1, at 410-19.  
 28. Id. at 410, 415-17. 
 29. Persons are genetically predisposed to benefit their offspring (the phenomenon of 
“nepotism”), and the selfish gene is unconcerned about overall efficiency. Professor Stake 
suggests that by preserving wealth for future generations of descendants, a progenitor 
helps to ensure their reproductive success. Id. at 415. But cf. John H. Beckstrom, Sociobi-
ology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 255-58 (1981) (suggesting 
that the selfish gene becomes indifferent to inheritance by collateral relatives once they are 
sufficiently far removed as to be no more likely than an unrelated person to share that 
gene—an indifference that should also set in, by analogy, with respect to remote genera-
tions of descendants). 
 30. MYLES I. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE H. LACKEY, JR., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN 
CONTROL: A GENERAL THEORY OF PURPOSEFUL BEHAVIOR 3-19 (1991). 
 31. For an early recognition, see SIR ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 183 (Lon-
don, Chatto & Windus 1880) (observing that dead hand control “is very commonly exer-
cised to its fullest extent, merely because it exists, and without the slightest reason beyond 
the pleasure of exercising power”). 
 32. Robert N. Butler, Looking Forward to What? The Life Review, Legacy, and Exces-
sive Identity Versus Change, 14 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 121, 123 (1970); David R. Unruh, 
Death and Personal History: Strategies of Identity Preservation, 30 SOC. PROBS. 340, 340-42 
(1983). Modern terror management theory explains efforts to achieve “symbolic immortal-
ity” as buffers against the psychological anxiety caused by one’s awareness of the inevita-
bility of death. Jamie Arndt et al., Terror Management and Self-Awareness: Evidence that 
Mortality Salience Provokes Avoidance of the Self-Focused State, 24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1216, 1217 (1998). 
 33. For an early recognition, see HENRY HOME (LORD KAMES), HISTORICAL LAW-
TRACTS 142 (Edinburgh, A. Kincaid 2d ed. 1761) (photo. reprint 2000) (1758) (“The man 
who has amassed great wealth, cannot think of quitting his hold, and yet, alas! he must die 
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Today’s statutory successor to the fee tail, the dynasty trust, may 
owe at least part of its popularity to these same psychological 
forces.34 
 The fundamental point, however, is that bounded rationality con-
demns litigants to a cloudy understanding of their economic inter-
ests, irrespective of the legal issue at hand. In practice, parties can 
be expected to invest in litigation on the basis not of technical eco-
nomics, but of intuitive or “folk” economics, applying the human 
equivalent of horse sense. If the differential-investment model was 
dubious to begin with, cognitive theory drives more nails into its cof-
fin.   
*     *     * 
 The alternative model, sometimes labeled “differential litiga-
tion,”35 is no less problematic under both the economists’ and psy-
chologists’ paradigms. The fundamental assumptions of this model 
are that (1) inefficient rules prompt more frequent challenges than 
efficient rules,36 and (2) courts overrule precedent infrequently and at 
random. By hypothesis, under these conditions, efficient rules should 
prevail for longer periods of time than inefficient ones. 
 The fact that law is a public good once again weakens the model, 
which depends on litigants choosing to challenge inefficient rules in 
greater numbers. As under the differential-investment model, any 
one litigant has a rational incentive to hold back and free ride off of 
the suits brought by other litigants.37 In the absence of (very difficult 
and elusive) cooperation,38 the result could well be mass paralysis, 
not mass litigation.     
                                                                                                                    
and leave the enjoyment to others. To colour a dismal prospect, he makes a deed . . . secur-
ing his estate . . . to those who represent him, in an endless train of succession. His estate 
and his heirs must for ever bear his name; [the] very thing to perpetuate his memory and 
his wealth.”). 
 34. See Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (examining the promotional literature for dynasty trusts); see also 
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 548 (1964). 
 35. Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 139. 
 36. Ostensibly, law here achieves “fitness” by virtue of the number of its advocates, 
rather than the strength of their individual suits. In nature, by analogy, species face a 
trade-off between the number and strength of offspring, because organisms have limited 
resources to devote to reproduction. DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 571-72 
(3d ed. 1998). In the context of homo sapiens, see Kevin Majoribanks, The Sibling Resource 
Dilution Theory: An Analysis, 125 J. PSYCHOL. 337 (1991). Because the resources of liti-
gants are also finite, such a trade-off should also exist in the realm of litigation, suggesting 
the possibility that the differential-investment and differential-litigation models are sus-
ceptible to theoretical consolidation. 
 37. For a theoretical admission of this problem as a weakness of the model, see Paul 
H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 60 (1977). 
 38. In this context, an interest group would have to act not merely collectively but 
also through coordinated actions by its individual members. 
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 In addition, consider how this process plays out within the pre-
vailing, hierarchical legal system: Inefficient rules are relitigated ini-
tially in the lower court, which cannot “underrule” them, and then 
decisions upholding precedent are appealed; the high court in the 
vast majority of jurisdictions exercises discretion over which appeals 
it will grant;39 and in order to divide its effort among the range of is-
sues it is pressed to hear, the high court filters out repetitive cases. 
Hence, at the acme of the legal system, where overruling can occur, 
suits will not be tried in the same proportion as they are brought in 
the baseline court; indeed, the frequency with which those suits come 
before the high court may bear no relation at all to the frequency 
with which they arise in lower courts. 
 And, once again, this is only the beginning; we need also to ponder 
the implications of psychology. The assumption that inefficient rules 
trigger more suits follows from the standard economic model of liti-
gation. This model posits that if competing litigants value a suit 
equally, they have a rational incentive to settle out of court rather 
than bear litigation expenses (which comprise a reciprocal dead-
weight loss).40 If a rule is inefficient, on the other hand, the party 
who would benefit from a rule change has more to gain from the liti-
gation (given the prospective value of the alternative, efficient rule) 
than the party who benefits from the existing, inefficient rule, 
thereby reducing the opportunity for mutually beneficial settle-
ment.41  
 Cognitive psychologists have cast doubt upon the soundness of the 
standard economic model, questioning the ability of litigants to as-
sess accurately the value of a claim, and hence their propensity to 
settle a case, even if it would otherwise appear rational for them to 
do so. Several researchers have bolstered their challenges with ex-
perimental evidence. On the one hand, self-serving (or egocentric) bi-
ases may encourage parties toward overoptimism—and thus to over-
value their respective claims, spurring litigation.42 Other psychologi-
cal barriers to settlement include framing (whereby plaintiffs tend to 
be risk-averse because they frame settlement as a gain, whereas de-
fendants tend to be risk preferrers because they frame settlement as 
a loss), equity seeking (whereby parties pursue moral vindication of 
their claims), and reactive devaluation (whereby parties wish to 
                                                                                                                    
 39. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.5 (1981). 
 40. E.g., POSNER, supra note 6, §§ 21.4-.5, at 567-73. 
 41. Rubin, supra note 37, at 53-55. This analysis assumes that both parties are repeat 
players who can benefit (or suffer) from the rule in the future. If both parties are one-time 
players, they have a mutual incentive to settle irrespective of whether the existing rule is 
efficient or inefficient. Id. at 56-57. For the scenario where only one of the two parties is a 
repeat player, see infra note 46. 
 42. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bar-
gaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 138-39 passim (1993). 
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avoid appearing to capitulate to an adversary).43 On the other hand, 
the phenomenon of regret aversion (that is, the desire to avoid the 
experience of knowing and regretting that one has made a wrong de-
cision) can help to produce settlement.44 And, once again, status quo 
bias should render settlement of challenges to inefficient rules more 
probable by enhancing the value of inefficient rights for those who 
benefit from them, hence rendering them willing to pay more to re-
tain them.45 This phenomenon could shift parties benefitting from in-
efficient rights up into the “settlement zone” where averting litiga-
tion becomes mutually attractive.  
 Put simply, the decision to settle a case vel non in human terms 
translates into a matter of psychological complexity that finds no 
parallel in the cold calculations of economics.46 Yet without those cal-
culations, the instant model loses its power to predict patterns of liti-
gation. 
 Of course, many parties make litigation decisions, concerning both 
expenditure and settlement, in consultation with expert attorneys. 
As professionals subject to market pressures of their own, those at-
torneys might be expected to develop some degree of immunity to ir-
rationality, thereby dampening the irrational tendencies of the cli-
ents they advise. Some evidence supports this hypothesis.47 At the 
same time, attorneys are human too. Several studies suggest that at-
                                                                                                                    
 43. For a discussion of all three phenomena, see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, 
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 107 (1994); and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 129 passim (1996). 
 44. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation 
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45-46 passim. 
 45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 46. Compare Professor Frank Cross, who argues that irrationality, especially in the 
tort or product liability arenas, “has a positive effect on justness and efficiency in the law.” 
Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-7, 24, 27 (2000). 
Because product liability or other tort plaintiffs are typically one-time players with no in-
terest in precedent, whereas defendants (such as manufacturers) may be repeat-players 
with a continuing interest in precedent, defendants have more at stake than plaintiffs, im-
peding settlement until the law favors the repeat player, irrespective of whether that out-
come is efficient. See Rubin, supra note 37, at 55-56 (constructing a general model). Profes-
sor Cross argues that irrational impediments to settlement on the part of plaintiffs help to 
compensate for the imbalance of incentives. Cross, supra, at 19-24. Of course, that would 
be true only in one band of the spectrum of common law suits. But even within that narrow 
band, Cross’s analysis appears dubious: For plaintiffs and defendants are both subject to 
the same, unpredictable irrationalities! Hence, irrationality should not have systematic 
consequences, even in this context.  
 47. Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 601, 638-44 (2003); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Econom-
ics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 95-121 
(1997).   
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torneys exhibit in particular the sorts of egocentric bias that psy-
chologists have previously observed in lay subjects.48  
 Attorneys may also have rational incentives to offer irrational ad-
vice. Attorneys benefit by increasing their own incomes—which could 
lead them to encourage all clients to invest more in litigation. On the 
other hand, whether litigation or settlement redounds to the advan-
tage of attorneys is less clear and could vary, depending upon the cir-
cumstances. But whenever agents act on behalf of principals, there 
exists the prospect of agency costs—here operating potentially to 
warp litigation decisions.49  
 In sum, any number of (not exclusively) cognitive phenomena may 
function to distort decisionmaking by litigating parties, and thereby 
to interfere with legal-evolutionary processes. The irreducible fact of 
human participation in the common law process, here as litigant 
rather than as lawmaker, undermines the potential for truly auto-
matic, noncognitive processes of legal change to unfold. We must 
nevertheless be careful to emphasize the limits of this critique: Cog-
nitive phenomena do not operate systematically to create counter-
vailing biases, channeling the common law in directions other than 
efficiency. They merely introduce noise into the system, rendering 
patterns of litigation erratic in the face of psychological cross-
currents. Hence, they may slow—but not halt—the drift toward effi-
ciency predicted by existing economic models. Still, there must come 
a point at which “noise litigants” drown out, for all intents and pur-
poses, rational economic maximizers in the litigation marketplace.50 
Whether that point has been reached cannot readily be hypothesized, 
although it might be susceptible to empirical investigation.    
*     *     * 
 Moving beyond theory, brief inspection of the common law pro-
vides abundant evidence of its production by decisionmakers with 
                                                                                                                    
 48. Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 860-
65 (1995) (citing to prior studies); Richard W. Painter, Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a 
Closing in Arthur Solmssen’s The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1128-33 
(2000). 
 49. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 47, at 121-24 (citing to studies). On the theo-
retical problem of agency costs, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305 (1976). 
 50. Notice that because lawsuits are inalienable, no opportunity for arbitrage—
squeezing out irrational litigants—exists within the litigation market. See Michael 
Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); see also Denis 
J. Hilton, Psychology and the Financial Markets: Applications to Understanding and 
Remedying Irrational Decision-Making, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 
273, 274-75 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (suggesting that markets con-
taining irrational traders can still be efficient). But cf. J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise 
Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 705 passim (1990) (suggesting 
that noise traders disrupt even financial markets that contain rational arbitrageurs). 
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human characteristics. The very fact that common law varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, confirming a theoretical prediction of cog-
nitive theory,51 appears to belie the efficiency hypothesis. Assuming 
local conditions do not dictate different efficient rules, a minimum of 
all but one of those variations must be inefficient. Similarly, within 
any given jurisdiction, the substance of the common law betrays 
manifold inconsistencies between structurally similar rules, as cogni-
tive theory would again predict.52 These rules cannot simultaneously 
be efficient. Still another cognitive phenomenon reflected in the 
common law is salience bias. “Salience biases refer to the fact that 
colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionately en-
gage attention and accordingly disproportionately affect judg-
ments.”53 This bias produces a legal pathology that is the mirror im-
age of structural inconsistency: When a new problem appears super-
ficially similar to another one that has already been resolved by a 
vivid common law rule, judges sometimes replicate the vivid rule 
thoughtlessly, again producing suboptimal law.54 In still other ways, 
the common law displays features that are telltale signs of underly-
ing cognitive phenomena, diminishing the potential for efficiency.55 
 This is not to say that common law dynamics are devoid of any 
evolutionary component. In particular, the progressive development 
of exceptions to rules suggests that processes of trial and error do 
yield legal improvements. Hence, rules initially announced in over-
broad terms become refined over time.56 This process need not oper-
ate automatically, however; it is fully explicable as an epistemic ex-
ercise, whereby lawmakers perceive what appear to be doctrinal er-
rors and strive, however imperfectly, to correct them.  
                                                                                                                    
 51. By hypothesis, these inconsistencies stem from “selective search” by lawmakers as 
a necessary aspect of attention rationing. Hirsch, Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 1337-42.  
 52. This phenomenon also follows from selective search. See id. at 1338-39. For an ex-
tended discussion, see Hirsch, Inconsistency, supra note 4. 
 53. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982); see also, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
MAKING 178-80 (1993). 
 54. One example was the historical extension of the common law Rule Against Perpe-
tuities from the arena of bequests to persons, where it made sense in general terms of pub-
lic policy, to the arena of bequests for purposes, where it made no sense at all. Evolution-
ary processes have not eroded this fallacious duality. For a discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, 
Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 84-87 (1999). For 
other illustrations of the same structural phenomenon, see, for example, Pamela Bucy, 
Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 
1095, 1114 (1991); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 804-08 (1983); and 
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and In-
terdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2002).  
 55. I discuss manifestations of one of these—to wit, task-interference within lawmak-
ing—in Hirsch, Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 1342-58. 
 56. Id. at 1340-42. 
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 And even if mechanistic processes of legal evolution were discov-
ered to exist, we can identify one other human element in the story 
that should function to thwart them.57 Whereas biological evolution 
takes place within what is, for the most part, a gradually changing, 
natural environment, legal evolution occurs within a rapidly chang-
ing cultural and technological environment.58 A rule that is well-
adapted to society one day may not be the next. Like the Red Queen, 
rules have to rush twice as fast just to keep up. In a mercurial world, 
any ineluctable tendencies toward efficiency must often prove insig-
nificant because they will be overtaken by the race of events.59 
 When the natural environment undergoes rapid change, as occa-
sionally happens, it can overwhelm the evolutionary process. The re-
sult is mass extinctions, which have occurred periodically in the his-
tory of life on earth.60 When shifts in the social environment cause 
law to become recognized as ineffectual, the overarching, non-
mechanistic aspects of the system (which are missing from the natu-
ral system) assert themselves unmistakably: Advertent lawmaking 
occurs.61 We may observe that common law jurisprudence anticipates 
and allows for this very eventuality—hence the common law maxim, 
cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.62 And, of course, legislators can 
also intercede as catalytic agents to update obsolescent common law. 
This was an element in the history of the fee tail, which at various 
times has been a creature of common and statutory law.63 But ad-
vertent lawmaking also brings us back to the realm of human foibles 
and fallibilities.  
 Indeed, it bears noting that even this systemic safety net can fail. 
It can fail in the face of human neglect: The general field of future in-
                                                                                                                    
 57. In some instances, movement toward legal efficiency is stymied by constitutional 
roadblocks. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (“Ultimately, our deci-
sion cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fair-
ness of criminal justice.”). But the same is true of nature, where the adaptive trends of spe-
cies can run up against limits imposed by the laws of chemistry and physics. RICHARD 
DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 190-91 (1986).   
 58. One is tempted to observe that the rate of social change is accelerating in the pre-
sent age, but that is something of a myth. See KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF 
HISTORICISM 160 (2d ed. 1960). 
 59. Cf. POSNER, supra note 6, § 21.6, at 574. 
 60. See generally MASS EXTINCTIONS: PROCESSES AND EVIDENCE (Stephen K. Donovan 
ed., 1989). 
 61. Compare Professor Epstein, who argues that departures from established prece-
dent within the common law more typically trace to judicial ideology than to social change, 
which only occasionally affects the utility of rules. Richard A. Epstein, The Static Concep-
tion of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 253-73 (1980). From a structural perspec-
tive, however, this distinction is not all that significant: Obviously, no court establishes ini-
tially what it perceives to be a flawed rule. It is the dynamic ideological environment—
which can be conceived as an aspect of the social environment—that alters perceptions and 
inspires advertent efforts to adapt the law to changing times.   
 62. E.g., In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 790 (N.C. 2003).  
 63. Stake, supra note 1, at 415-19. 
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terests law, from which Professor Stake has drawn his principal il-
lustration of legal change, gives every indication of having become 
stranded in the past, by and large.64 Although law plainly has the ca-
pacity to adapt to the social environment, society just as plainly has 
the capacity, for extended periods, to tolerate antique and inefficient 
law. 
 And the safety net can also fail in the face of relentless change it-
self. The late Grant Gilmore, for example, famously confessed that 
the Uniform Commercial Code was already obsolescent by the time it 
was promulgated.65 If even thoughtful lawmakers sometimes lose 
their race against time to maintain the law’s currency, then how 
much less effective must be the gentler, thoughtless impulses for le-
gal evolution operating in the background, especially when weakened 
by the presence of irrational litigants? 
*     *     * 
 The doubts and concerns expressed up to now have presupposed 
a common law system as it currently exists—with a fixed principle 
of precedent and a fixed, hierarchical organization of courts. But, 
as any legal historian knows, nothing about law (at least since bib-
lical times) is written in stone. Like rules, jurisprudence and legal 
process also vary over time. And if the mechanisms of legal change 
are themselves changeable, then the extent of the common law’s 
tendency toward efficiency may likewise prove temporally dy-
namic. 
 In recent articles, several commentators have underscored this 
point, claiming that the common law has been pushed in the direc-
tion of efficiency, and then in other directions, at different moments 
in its history.66 According to one scholar, the common law has 
                                                                                                                    
 64. The titles alone speak volumes: W. BARTON LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED! OR 
THE PEOPLE VS. BLACKSTONE, KENT, GRAY, AND STARE DECISIS (ACCESSORIES: PONTIUS 
PILATE AND THE LAWS OF THE MEDES AND THE PERSIANS) (1967); William F. Fratcher, Ex-
orcise the Curse of Reversionary Possibilities, 28 J. MO. B. 34 (1972); Wythe Holt, The Tes-
tator Who Gave Away Less than All He or She Had: Perversions in the Law of Future Inter-
ests, 32 ALA. L. REV. 69 (1980); Taylor Mattis & David Schellenberg, The Doctrine of Wor-
thier Title in Illinois: Burying the Dead, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1989); Ronald Maud-
sley, Escaping the Tyranny of Common Law Estates, 42 MO. L. REV. 355 (1977); Nicholas L. 
White, Bringing Tennessee into the Twentieth Century Re Possibilities of Reverter, Powers 
of Termination and Executory Interests when Used as Land Control Devices, 15 MEMPHIS 
ST. U. L. REV. 555 (1985); Robert R. Wright, Medieval Law in the Age of Space: Some 
“Rules of Property” in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REV. 248 (1968); Charles M. Agee, Jr., Note, 
Has Tennessee Abolished Its Ancient Class Gift Doctrine or Only Modified It?, 7 MEMPHIS 
ST. U. L. REV. 129 (1976). 
 65. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 627 (1981). 
 66. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common 
Law: A Hypothesis, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2004); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of 
Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003). 
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tended most strongly toward efficiency when and where it has fea-
tured (1) overlapping tribunals, (2) in competition with one another 
for business, where (3) parties commit to a tribunal before they 
know whether they will comprise plaintiffs or defendants.67 Under 
these conditions, parties’ choices among alternative venues provide 
the selective pressure (quite literally!) for provision of optimal 
rules.68 Observe, however, the unspoken cognitive assumptions of 
this hypothesis: (1) most parties prefer, and hence select, rules that 
feature the quality of efficiency (as opposed to distributive fairness, 
or other qualities), (2) parties have the capacity to identify efficient 
rules, and (3) parties have the time and mental energy to go ahead 
and make the identification. We may call into question every one of 
these assumptions.  
 In the wake of Erie,69 the opportunities for efficiency-generating 
forum shopping within the American legal system have ostensibly 
dwindled.70 Nevertheless, there remains at least one useful testing 
ground for the hypothesis—to wit, corporate common law. In the-
ory, competition for corporate charters should produce efficient 
rules (at least as regards disputes between corporations, putting 
aside the special problem of disputes between management—which 
selects the situs—and shareholders).71 Here, indeed, there exist a 
large number of “overlapping” jurisdictions to choose from, and cor-
porations select their litigation situs before disputes arise, hence 
behind a veil of ignorance. What is more, corporations have a strong 
incentive (stronger perhaps than among private parties72) to favor 
the jurisprudential ideal of wealth maximization. Yet, for all of 
that, at least some commentators have doubted whether corporate 
managers choose fora rationally. Professor John Coffee suggests 
that Delaware’s success in attracting charters may in part have re-
sulted from “herd” behavior:  
                                                                                                                    
 67. Zywicki, supra note 66, at 1581-1621. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 70. Zywicki, supra note 66, at 1621; see also id. at 1552. 
 71. State courts have no direct mercenary incentive to compete with each other, al-
though the appointments process helps to create indirect incentives for judicial respon-
siveness. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 39-40 (1993) 
(focusing on Delaware). In other contexts, where mercenary incentives are nonexistent, 
modern versions of overlapping fora should not create tendencies toward efficiency, even 
assuming all parties are rational. Thus, the rise of institutionalized alternative dispute 
resolution has not triggered competition with courts to supply efficient legal process. On 
the contrary, “the judicial trend is to encourage more rather than less arbitration and in 
more diversified contexts,” precisely in order to achieve “docket reduction.” IAN MACNEIL, 
RICARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 3.2.5, at 3:15 
(1999).  
 72. For a recent inquiry into public attitudes, see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tet-
lock, An Empirical Inquiry into the Relation of Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice 
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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Corporations may prefer to locate in a popular jurisdiction of in-
corporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not 
the inherent superiority of its law. Such a “safe” decision protects 
the corporation’s advisers from criticism, pleases uninformed 
shareholders who assume it is correct, and produces no adverse 
reaction from a marketplace that cannot easily evaluate legal dif-
ferences and so prefers the consensus choice.73 
Similar sorts of information cascades, grounded in the cognitive costs 
of determining legal optimality, could likewise impede common law 
selective pressure in other situations and contexts.74   
 Even if there were some way around this problem, we must still 
contend with the cognitive bottleneck of jurisprudence itself. For, 
mechanistic processes aside, legal change remains advertent in the 
sense that it occurs within the confines of a system of legal process 
that is itself the product of human design, and that can be—and pe-
riodically is—redesigned. Hence, the efficiency of the common law 
depends ultimately upon human decisions. And, for all appearances, 
lawmakers’ larger operational decisions have been taken without a 
thought to their implications for the generation of legal efficiency 
over time;75 that tendency, to the extent it has existed, has invariably 
comprised an epiphenomenon of other, more immediate concerns or 
perhaps chance events—this being just another reflection of the 
bounded rationality of the legal system’s human designers.  
 Still, could jurisprudence and legal process themselves respond, 
peradventure, to blind pressures for the provision of efficient law, 
thereby manifesting what we might dub meta-evolutionary tenden-
                                                                                                                    
 73. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence 
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 703 (1999). For a re-
lated discussion, suggesting that “the market is not capable of assessing the efficiency of a 
legal regime,” see Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company 
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 
VAND. L. REV. 231, 269 (2001). 
 74. As suggested by Coffee’s brief critique, herding into a legal forum may be 
prompted by incentives other than attempting to free ride on the cognitive expenses borne 
by others. Such herding also insulates the advising attorney from criticism. “[I]t is better 
for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.” JOHN M. KEYNES, 
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 158 (1936), quoted in Mar-
cel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Re-
turns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 355-56 (1996). Profes-
sors Kahan and Klausner assume the phenomenon represents an agency cost, Kahan & 
Klausner, supra, at 355, but individual parties deciding for themselves might also fear 
ridicule following an unconventional failure of judgment. See J. RICHARD EISER, SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: ATTITUDES, COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 36-37 (1986). Finally, herding 
may also reflect a “network externality”: The choice of one litigation situs over another 
may be self-reinforcing, as that situs builds up a larger store of precedents and thereby in-
creases legal certainty. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks 
of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 841-47 (1995). 
 75. See Klerman, supra note 66, at 14; Zywicki, supra note 66, at 1621. 
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cies?76 Professor Stake raises this possibility at the outset of his arti-
cle, when he suggests provocatively that more successful legal sys-
tems are apt to supplant less successful ones in the competition be-
tween nation states, or in revolutionary struggles, leading in the di-
rection of systems with the capacity to furnish society with optimal 
law.77  
 Alas, this notion appears fanciful. Law adds an ingredient to the 
overall strength of a state, to be sure, but all else is never equal. 
When we come to “muscular economics,”78 the extent of resources be-
comes at least as important as the efficiency of their deployment, and 
other factors, such as manpower, the presence of a motivating ideol-
ogy, charismatic leadership, and a military esprit de corps come into 
play. All in all, the importance of internal law in sustaining a regime 
is hardly manifest.  
 Meta-evolution, then, offers no escape from the bounded rational-
ity of common law. Irrationality will be bred out of our rules, and out 
of our mechanisms for producing rules, only when it is bred out of us. 
                                                                                                                    
 76. Sir Henry Maine may have anticipated the idea when he remarked cryptically 
that “even jurisprudence itself cannot escape from the great law of evolution.” Quoted in 
PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 100 (1980). 
 77. Stake, supra note 1, at 403. Consider also Professor Rubin’s suggestion that “the 
reduced power of the state in common law systems” makes “more likely” the development 
of competitive, overlapping jurisdictions. Rubin, supra note 12 (appearing in both versions 
of the essay). Although states with common law have featured overlapping jurisdictions at 
various times, there is no manifest historical trend toward their precipitation within those 
states. 
 78. Professor Hirshleifer’s felicitous phrase. Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the 
Force, 32 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 2 (1994). 
 
